Relations between South Africa and Rwanda have suffered a sharp downturn in the first three months of 2014 with the murder in South Africa on New Year’s Eve of Patrick Karegeya, the former head of Rwandan external intelligence, and the attempted murder in Johannesburg in early March of the former head of the Rwandan army, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. Both men were once close confidants of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, but since fleeing Rwanda for South Africa, in 2007 and 2010 respectively, both have been viewed by Kigali as traitors, terrorists and legitimate targets for elimination. Indeed this was the third attempt on Nyamwasa’s life, following two failed attempts in South Africa in June 2010.
While the Rwandan regime formally denied responsibility, the operations fit an established pattern of Rwandan attacks on exiled opponents. Predictably, they have poisoned South African-Rwandan relations, which had been close until South Africa began providing safe haven for Rwandan exiles, even as differences between the two states emerged over the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
On March 7, Pretoria expelled three Rwandan diplomats and one from Burundi for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status; the South African security services directly linked the individuals to the murder of Karegeya and attempted murder of Nyamwasa. Rwanda responded immediately by expelling six South African diplomats from Kigali, “in reciprocity” but also as a protest at South Africa’s harboring of dissidents allegedly sponsoring terrorist attacks in Rwanda. The expulsions have left the two states just one step away from a formal termination of diplomatic relations, with only the respective high commissioners—both are Commonwealth states—remaining in place in each capital.
This episode has provided an unwelcome and unexpected setback to South Africa’s diplomatic ambitions in Africa, where it seeks to position itself, through its role in the African Union, BRICS and the G-20, as Africa’s natural leader and champion of the continent’s interests. Open diplomatic rifts with another African state are incompatible with this agenda. This is particularly true of a smaller African state, which makes it easy for South Africa’s African critics to brand it an overbearing hegemon, an image South African diplomats have worked hard to banish.
In fact, although Rwanda may be small geographically, in the post-genocide era it has punched well above its weight in continental and subregional affairs, and militarily has emerged as something of an African Sparta with a proven capacity to project force beyond its own borders. South Africa feels it needs to engage Rwanda because of Kigali’s important role in ensuring stability—or instability—in eastern DRC, where South Africa is participating in the United Nations intervention force and Rwanda is believed to be supporting the M23 rebels. Also at stake are South African commercial interests, including ensuring the smooth development of the proposed free trade area between the 26 member states of the South African Development Community, the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.
Consequently this situation has created a dilemma for South African policymakers. Pretoria wants to make explicit its strong objections to such a flagrant breach of its sovereignty and security by Rwanda and to warn Kigali that persisting with such behavior will cause irreparable damage to the relationship. At the same time it wants to avoid isolating Rwanda by maintaining channels of communication and attempting to initiate a dialogue. Thus far, South Africa has contented itself with a cautious, legalistic approach. Its expulsions are fully compliant with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, whereas Rwanda’s are essentially retaliatory rather than legally based. FULL STORY