Nov 18th 2013, 16:52 by D.H. | NAIROBI
THE fine print of peace in eastern Congo matters, not least when it involves a rebel group named after the date of a failed past attempt. A deal with the March 23rd movement (M23) ought to have been straightforward after the group’s comprehensive military defeat by the combination of a more determined Congolese army and a beefed-up United Nations force.
But efforts to make a deal ultimately foundered over a single word. The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo refused to sign an “accord” with the mutineers it had defeated on the battlefield. Instead they wanted a “declaration” that would have paved the way for the rank and file of the ethnic Tutsi-led rebellion to be folded into the national army.
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Earlier this month, the M23 was driven into neighbouring Uganda before being forced to surrender, but at the peace table both sides remained intransigent. The Congolese government delegation argued that it had no reason to sign an agreement with a group that had announced its own dissolution. The leaders of the M23, meanwhile, know that they stand little to gain from peace and may well face charges of war crimes.
For its part, Uganda, which hosted the negotiations and was eager to claim the credit for sealing a deal, was clearly annoyed when it failed to materialise. A government spokesman warned that the M23 might regroup and pose a threat once more—a particularly pointed statement given that that could only happen with Ugandan support.
Martin Kobler, the UN’s tough-talking Congo envoy, warned that the 2,000 or so M23 troops still at large in Uganda and Rwanda are an “accident waiting to happen” in the absence of a deal. The UN has now turned its sights to another rebel group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), some of whose veterans took part in the ethnic Hutu-led slaughter in Rwanda nearly twenty years ago.
As much as the terms of any deal with M23, the pursuit of the FDLR will determine whether peace endures in eastern Congo. Both rebel groups trace their roots to the appalling aftermath of the 1994 genocide. The presence of the FDLR in Congo has prompted repeated interference by Rwanda in its larger neighbour. It has also justified the country’s covert support for Tutsi rebellions across the border, which has seen it censured.
If the Tanzanian and South African troops, who make up the bulk of the UN’s recently effective intervention force, pursue the FDLR with vigour they may remove one of Rwanda’s most important grievances. That in turn would open the door to detente between the Congolese and Rwandan governments—the main prerequisite for lasting stability in the Great Lakes region.
